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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2

JOSHUA JACOB ST. CLAIR,

Case No. 950152-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION

TEMF

After defendant pled

.ATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
'-•• ••

>

Regret i'elony,

and one count of criminal mischief, a third-degree felony (R. 20), Judge John A.
Rokich sentenced him to two concurrent prison sentences: one to fifteen years for
the second-degree felony and zero to five years for the third-degree felony, plus
restitution in the amount of $8,108 (R. 35). Defendant's appeal of his sentence is
properly in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(f) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES ON AIM'FAI AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether defendant's failure lo an.'iir In the ln.il roun that it; was

required to impose the guidelines sentence precludes his raising the issu

the

first time on appeal. Because the trial court did not examine this issue, there is
no standard of review applicable.

2.

Did the trial court violate equal protection or the uniform application

of laws requirement by sentencing defendant to prison and defendant's partner-incrime, Jason John Black, to probation. An appellate court will modify a district
court's discretionary choice in sentencing only if "no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121
(Utah App. 1995).
3.

Whether defendant's failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea in the trial court within 30 days deprives this Court of jurisdiction to
determine whether the plea was knowing and voluntary or taken in strict
compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? This issue is a
question of law that this Court should review for correctness. State v. James.
819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); see also. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah
App. 1992).
4.

Did defendant's failure to file with the trial court an affidavit under

rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the judge was biased, bar
him from raising the issue on appeal? Because the trial court did not examine
this isssue, there is no standard of review applicable.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Relevant provisions are included in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural history
()n November *, J'-J'M, delcndanl pled umllv to on< count of theft a
v- ond-degree felony, and one count of criminal mischi* • - third-degree felony
(R. 20). On January 19, 1995, the trial court sentenced defendant to two
concurrent prison sentences: one to fifteen years for the second-degree felony and
zero to five years for the third-degree felony, plus restitution in the amount of
$8,108 (R. 35). On January 27, 1995, more than sixty days after pleading guilty,
defendant moved to withdraw his plea (R. 59). By an unsigned minute entry
dated January M\, I 'W i ih u lal i omi deme
K'hruar I "\ It1'11'' defendant tilnl a notiiv -

:?'•• . ...
.-.-•

-:..s

never issued a signed order denying the motion to withdraw fid.)
Shortly after defendant filed his docketing statement, the State filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the trial court had not yet issued
a final order regarding the motion to withdraw fid.). This Court granted that
motion in part, dismissing the appeal as it relates to defendant's motion to
withdraw his jnnliv plea (iii.i

Despili: tins < 'omi \ ordci, defendant's brief dealt
3

extensively with the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The State filed a motion
to strike these portions on August 28, 1995 and on September 20, 1995, the
Court granted the motion. On November 30, 1995, after defendant had filed an
untimely response to the motion and the order, this Court vacated its September
20 order, striking only point VII of the defendant's brief.
Statement offacts
This statement is taken from defendant's pre-sentence report, a copy of
which is attached to his brief.
Defendant and a group of other people stole a 1994 Ford F150 pickup
truck and a 1994 Ford Probe from Timothy Ford/Chrysler Auto Dealership in
Tooele, Utah (Pre-sentence investigation, at 2; attached to defendant's brief).
They drove the truck up to Middle Canyon, vandalized it, and then drove the
Probe to Little Mountain in Grantsville, stripping it of its speakers, spare tire,
and jack fid."). The group "started to drive the Probe around the gravel pit,
jumping it off small hills, running it into hills and spinning circles. After awhile
all four began to break the windows and beat on the car. The last thing they did
was to put a rock on the accelerator and run it into a ditch" (id.). The vandalism
to both vehicles caused $23,000 in damage (id.).

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because of defendant's failure to raise issues before the trial court and to
file his motion to withdraw his pleas within the 30-day period, he is now
precluded from seeking review in this Court. Defendant never argued to the trial
court that it had to sentence him to probation because of AP&P's calculation of
. guidelines. Rath-.

. •.-..

recommendation linplieill, recouniziny lliiil il I'ould

IVIIIM'

in ilu so

Mso e\in

though the trial court told defendant that he only had 30 days in which to
withdraw his pleas, defendant did not file for more than two months.
Defendant's also failed to properly bring to the trial court's attention his
allegation of bias through an affidavit under rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. This rule provides a mechanism for bringing allegations of bias and
prejudice against a judge and musl he used he I ore appeal. These procedural
delects preu'iil Ilu, Cnurl I nun re\ir\nii" F

VI.

Nevertheless, even if this Court were to decide the merits of defendant's
arguments, it would find that they are insubstantial. They either ignore or
misconstrue the governing case law or misstate the evidence in the record.
Defendant's claim that the trial court violated equal protection because it
did not give him the same sentence it did to his co-defendant, Jason John Black,
5

is similarly misplaced. The equal protection does not require that individuals
with different characteristics and backgrounds be given the same sentence, even
if they were convicted of the same crime. Defendant had a much lengthier
juvenile criminal history, showed less cooperation with the police and, in
general, appeared a less promising candidate for probation than did Black. Based
on these disparate circumstances, defendant cannot say that "no unreasonable
person" would have adopted the trial court's view, i.e., that defendant should be
sent to prison.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE THE
TRIAL COURT THE OPPORTUNITY TO
ADDRESS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES REQUIRED THE
COURT TO IMPOSE PROBATION, THIS COURT
SHOULD NOT REVIEW THE ARGUMENT ON
APPEAL.

On appeal, defendant claims that the Utah Sentencing and Release
Guidelines required the trial court to give defendant probation. Brief of
defendant at 4-5. Although defendant asked the trial court to follow Adult
Probation & Parole's recommendation for probation, he did not argue to the
court, as he does now, that it legally had no other choice. Defendant's present
attempt to assert this claim for the first time on appeal violates the "longstanding
6

rule" that appellants must first give the trial court the opportunity to address an
objection. State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1994); State v. Bywater.
748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987) (applying to sentencing issues the "longstanding
rule" that issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived). Although "plain
error" may allow an appellant to survive a failure to raise an issue before the trial
court, defendant has not even argued plain error. Finally, the fact that defendant
requested the trial court to impose the guidelines sentence probably led the court
to believe that it was free to disregard the guidelines. Thus, any attempt to argue
plain error would be defeated by the fact that defendant himself invited the
court's ruling and may not now attack it on appeal. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).1

1

Despite defendant's inability to raise this claim on appeal due to his failure to
raise the issue in the trial court, the idea that trial courts are bound by the sentencing
guidelines is simply wrong. In Preece v. House. 886 P.2d 508, 510 (Utah 1994), the Utah
Supreme Court concluded that the Board of Pardons and Parole was not required to use the
guidelines in fixing a parole release date and that the guidelines did not have the "force and
effect of law." This conclusion logically governs defendant's analogous claim that the
guidelines prohibit courts from using their independent reasoning in setting a sentence.
The actual standard of review here is not whether the sentence exceeded the guidelines
but whether "no reasonable person" could adopt the trial court's view that a prison sentence,
rather than probation, was appropriate. State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah App.
1995). Given defendant's 38 prior adjudications of guilt while a juvenile, his refusal to
cooperate with AP&P in the pre-sentence investigation process, and the extent of damage
committed in this offense, the trial court's decision to incarcerate defendant seems eminently
reasonable.
7

H.

THE DIFFERENT SENTENCES THE TRIAL
COURT GAVE DEFENDANT AND JASON BLACK
WERE WARRANTED BY THE DIFFERENT
CIRCUMSTANCES IN EACH CASE.2

Defendant claims he should have received probation because Jason Black,
his co-perpetrator, did. This argument is based on a fundamental
mischaracterization of the law, the evidence, and the record. Co-defendants are
not entitled to the same sentence even if they are convicted of the same crimes.
State v. Warnell. 864 P.2d 175, 178-79 (Idaho App. 1993). To the extent
possible and reasonable, sentencing is an attempt at individualized justice. Utah's
sentencing system is unlike the federal government's, where sentences are
calculated by simple addition and subtraction.3 Here, a plethora of factors go
into sentencing that cannot be reduced to numbers. These factors include the
crime, the defendant's's criminal history, and social and educational background
as well as the public safety and the impact on victims. From evaluating these

2

This point corresponds to defendant's point II.

3

In State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah App. 1995), this Court stated:
"This discretion [to sentence] is not to be surrendered to a mathematical formula by which
numbers of circumstances rather than weight of circumstances are determinative. The
overriding consideration is that the sentence is just. One factor in mitigation or aggravation
may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale."
8

verifiable bits of information, courts arrive at a perspective on the defendant and
the amount of prison time, if any, needed to positively influence his future, exact
punishment, and protect the safety of the public. Id.
Perhaps the single most important evidence in determining a sentence is the
defendant's criminal history. Throughout his brief, defendant asserts that his
criminal history is similar to Black's. Brief of defendant at 2, 6, 7, 8, 9. This
claim is false. A brief look at the PSIs and the transcript from the sentencing
hearing shows that defendant, unlike Black, had an extensive criminal history.
As the prosecutor pointed out in his recommendation to the judge, to which
defendant did not object, defendant was adjudicated guilty of 38 offenses while a
juvenile (R. 62 at 17). Five of these adjudications were for crimes that would
have been felonies if committed by adults (id.y Defendant also previously served
a six-month juvenile probation sentence (id.V
By comparison, Black committed seven juvenile offenses and was never
previously on probation. (Pre-sentence report of Jason John Black, attached to
defendant's brief). Further, unlike defendant, Black cooperated with law
enforcement and with AP&P after his conviction. The differences between the
co-defendants is nicely shown by Detective Sutherland's comments in both PSIs.
Detective Sutherland said of Black that he "does not believe the defendant [Black]
9

should go to prison, but he does believe the sentence should make an impression
on the defendant to try and moderate his behavior." (Pre-sentence report on
Jason Black, at 5; attached to defendant's brief). Regarding defendant, however,
the detective said "[He] is responsible for quite a few vehicle thefts in the area
over the last few months, and he does not believe the defendant will change his
behavior because he does not care." (Pre-sentence report on defendant, at 5;
attached to defendant's brief).4
AP&P's evaluative summaries were similar in tone to these comments.
The PSI described Black as "an excellent candidate for probation," while casting
doubt on its own recommendation for probation in defendant's case, "His
cooperation with this agency in arranging for this report is less than satisfactory
leading Adult Probation & Parole to question whether the defendant will abide by
the terms of probation." (Black's pre-sentence report at 9; defendant's presentence report at 12).
Defendant's persistent and continuing criminal conduct gave sufficient
reason for the trial court to treat him differently than Black. The constitutional
requirement to apply the law uniformly does not require the courts to ignore
4

Although Detective Sutherland also said that he recommended defendant receive
a sentence similar to Black's, the trial court had the right to believe Sutherland's comment was
right, but that his sentence recommendation was wrong.
10

fundamental differences in background and character. Wright. 893 P.2d at 1121.
These fundamental differences, which defendant still refuses to admit, required
different sentences. The trial court thus fulfilled its mandate to consider each
defendant individually to arrive at a just result and acted within its lawful
discretion.
m.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW fflS GUILTY PLEA CAME MORE
THAN 30 DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE
PLEA, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE MERITS OF
THE REQUEST AND THIS COURT SHOULD
AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE
MOTION ON THAT BASIS.5

On November 3, 1994, defendant entered his guilty plea (R. 62 at 8-9).
The trial court told him he had 30 days to withdraw it (id.). Thus, under State v.
Price. 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), the 30-day time limit became
jurisdictional and, if the defendant failed to bring his motion within 30 days, the
trial court could not grant it. State v. Price. 837 P.2d at 583. Defendant did not
file his motion to withdraw the guilty plea until January 27, 1995, more than two
months after pleading guilty (R. 39).

5

The analysis under this point heading responds to points in, IV, and V of
defendant's brief. Defendant's point VH also deals with the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea, but this Court has already ordered it stricken.

11

In Price, this Court specifically held that the 30-day time limit was
jurisdictional and could not be waived. Price. 837 P.2d at 583; Olson v. Salt
Lake School District. 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986) (acquiescence is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction, which can be raised for the first time on
appeal). Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the merits of
defendant's withdrawal motion, this Court should refuse to review the merits of
the issues listed in defendants points III, IV, and IV and affirm the trial court's
denial of the motion to withdraw defendant's guilty pleas.6
6

Even if this jurisdictional barrier did not preclude review of the merits,
defendant's substantive claims are without either a legal or factual basis. Regarding point HI,
i.e., whether the knowledge of his co-defendant's sentence to probation wrongfully lulled him
into pleading guilty, the cases defendant's cite do not stand for his essential premise that his
subjective hope of getting a good deal defeats an admitted "intellectual understanding" that the
court could sentence him to hard time. Brief of Defendant at 9. The trial court did tell
defendant that it could go beyond the recommendations of AP&P and the prosecutor. The
court never led defendant to believe he would get the same sentence as his co-defendant (R. 62
at 7).
Regarding point IV, i.e.,the facts simply refute the allegation that the prosecutor did
not fulfill his promise to recommend a diagnostic evaluation. During the change of plea
hearing, prosecutor Jeppsen specifically told the court, "We're requesting a 90-day diagnostic
evaluation" (R. 62 at 10). The defense attorney did not follow up on this request or even join
in the motion and the trial court never ordered the evaluation. Ironically, the defense attorney
actually asked to expedite the sentencing hearing, virtually assuring that no diagnostic
evaluation could practically occur. Further, defendant's attorney affirmatively agreed to the
imposition of sentence even without the evaluation (R. 62 at 16).
Concerning point V, the trial court's plea colloquy was thorough and in compliance
with rule 11. The trial court went through each part of rule 11, explaining to defendant the
rights he was surrendering, the elements of the offenses to which he was pleading and the
supporting factual elements, the potential sentences, and the time limits for withdrawing the
appeal (R. 62 at 6-9). Finally, the trial court found and concluded that the plea was made
12

IV.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT FILE AN
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDICIAL BIAS WITH THE
TRIAL COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 63(b),
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, HE IS
PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING APPELLATE
REVIEW OF THE ISSUE.7

Defendant's claim that the judge's comments during the sentencing hearing
evidenced personal bias should not be reviewed under the general principle that
issues raised for the first time on appeal cannot be considered. Wade v. Stangl.
869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that general principle applies to
allegations of judicial bias). The rules of civil procedure expressly give litigants
a mechanism by which they can raise their concerns of bias to the judge and then,
if necessary, seek judicial review. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b) (1995); Sukin v. Sukin.
842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App. 1992) (appellate court will not consider allegations
of judicial bias under appellant first complied with rule 63(b)). Defendant never
filed an affidavit with the trial court. Therefore, this Court should refuse to
entertain the issue on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions and sentences should be affirmed.

knowingly and voluntarily (id.).
7

This point corresponds to point VI of defendant's brief.
13

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
The State does not believe oral argument will assist the Court in deciding
this case. Additionally, this case does not present novel or complicated issues
that need to be published in order to assist courts and practitioners.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ffflday of December 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On the J^^day of December 1995, two (2) copies of this BRIEF OF
APPELLEE were sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
440 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM

A

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

